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I. INTRODUCTION
The New Orthodoxy in antitrust, sometimes described as the "Chicago
School," holds that the only proper objective of antitrust is the protection of
consumer welfare.' Its adherents rely on Supreme Court pronouncements that
"Congress designed the Sherman Act as a 'consumer welfare prescription,' ",2 and
that" [i]t is competition, not competitors, which the Act protects. "3 Yet the Supreme
Court has never ruled that producers are excluded from the protection of the antitrust
laws and has frequently held to the contrary. In Mandeville Island Farms v. American
Crystal Sugar,4 the complaint charged a conspiracy among buyers of sugar beets to
pay a uniform price for the product.5 In sustaining the complaint, the Supreme Court
observed:
It is clear that the agreement is the sort of combination condemned by the Act, even though
the price-fixing was by purchasers, and the persons specially injured under the treble damage
claim are sellers, not customers or consumers. 6...
The statute does not confine its protection to consumers, or to purchasers, or to competitors,
or to sellers.... The Act is comprehensive in its terms and coverage, protecting all who are
made victims by the forbidden practices by whomever they may be perpetrated. 7
It is the thesis of this Article that Mandeville Island Farms is good law, not only
as it applies to buyer collusion, but in its general doctrinal theme.8 The antitrust laws
were intended to protect producers as well as consumers and may properly be invoked
by producers in cases in which consumer interests are not implicated.
In the continuing debate over the proper role of antitrust, most attention has been
* Milton Handler Professor of Trade Regulation, Columbia University School of Law.
1. See R. BoPK, THE ANTmrusr PARADOX 71, 89 (1978); R. PosNE, Asrrrusr LAw 18-20 (1976); Easterbrook,
Workable Antitrust Policy, 84 Mtcs. L. REv. 1696, 1703 (1986); Gerhart, The Supreme Court and Economic Analysis:
The (Near) Triumph of the Chicago School, 1982 Sup. Cr. Ray. 319, 321; cf. 1 P. AREEDA & D. TURNER, Anmrmusr LAw
103-13 (1978) (discussing populist as well as economic antitrust objectives).
See also Fox, Consumer Beware Chicago, 84 MiCH. L. REv. 1714 (1986); Hovencamp, Antitrust Policy After
Chicago, 84 Mtctt. L. REa. 213 (1985); Hovencamp, Chicago and Its Alternatives, 1986 Duic L. J. 1014; Wiley, "After
Chicago": An Exaggerated Demise?, 1986 Dua L. J. 1003.
2. Reiter v. Sonotone Corp., 442 U.S. 330, 343 (1979) (quoting R. BortK, supra note 1, at 66). The Sherman Act
is codified at 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-7 (1982).
3. Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294, 344 (1962).
4. 334 U.S. 219 (1948).
5. Id. at 223.
6. Id. at 235.
7. Id. at 236.
8. Buyer collusion may adversely affect consumers if, as a result of the collusion, the supply offered is less than
the competitive norm and, as a consequence, the buyers' prices to consumers (on resale) are enhanced. But if buyers
purchase in local markets and sell in a national market, and if the national market is competitive, collusion among buyers
will not have any impact upon the national market or on consumer interests. In such a case, the colluding buyers will be
able to expropriate rents otherwise accruing to more favorably situated sellers, but price and output in the national market
(in which the colluding buyers resell) will be determined by the normal interplay of competitive forces. For an example,
see Cackling Acres, Inc. v. Olson Farms, Inc., 541 F.2d 242 (10th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1122 (1977).
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attracted by views at the extreme. As noted, the Chicago School confines antitrust to
the protection of consumer welfare. Adversaries tend to propound a multiplicity of
antitrust objectives: the control of corporate power in both the economic and political
spheres; the preservation of small business and small business opportunities; and the
protection of traders against oppression and unfair dealing. 9 This Article makes a
more limited case against the position of the Chicago School. It asserts that antitrust
protects competitive markets and access to such markets, and that the protection thus
afforded extends to producers as well as consumers. To provide a reasonably focused
exposition, discussion is confined to agreements among business firms not to deal
with other business firms. 10
A concerted refusal to deal may injure consumers in one of three ways:
(1) Competitors may agree to adhere to specific terms and to refuse to deal on
any other basis, thereby depriving purchasers of the opportunity to choose among
diverse proposals. If the subject of the agreement is price, or some term closely
related to price, the agreement is unlawful per se.t a Concerted action on other
terms-such as a requirement that disputes be submitted to arbitration-also may be
unlawful. 1 2
(2) Competitors may engage in price fixing, or in some other form of cartel
activity, and seek to enhance the effectiveness of their endeavors by refusing to deal
9. See, e.g., Antitrust Jurisprudence: A Symposium on the Economic, Political and Social Goals of Antitrust
Policy, 125 U. PA. L. REv. 1182 (1977).
10. See, e.g., L. SuwvN, HANDBOOK OFTHE LAW OF ATn-RuSr §§ 83-92 (1977); Barber, Refusals to Deal Under
the Federal Antitrust Laws, 103 U. PA. L. REv. 847 (1955); Bauer, Per Se Illegality of Concerted Refusals to Deal: A
Rule Ripe for Reexamination, 79 COLuM. L. REv. 685 (1979); Brunet & Sweeney, Integrating Antitrust Procedure and
Substance after Northwest Wholesale Stationers: Evolving Antitrust Approaches to Pleadings, Burden of Proof, and
Boycotts, 72 VA. L. REV. 1015 (1986); Heidt, Industry Self-Regulation and the Useless Concept "Group Boycott", 39
VArN. L. REv. 1507 (1986); Kissam, Antitrust BoycottDoctrine, 69 IowA L. REv. 1165 (1984); Ponsoldt, TheApplication
of Sherman ActAntiboycott Law to Industry Self-Regulation: An Analysis Integrating Nonboycott Sherman Act Principles,
55 S. CAL. L. Rev. 1 (1981); Rahl, Per Se Rules and Boycotts Under the Sherman Act: Refusals to Deal Under the Federal
Antitrust Laws, 45 VA. L. REv. 1165 (1959); Note, Trade Association Exclusionary Practices: An Affirmative Role for
the Rule ofReason, 66 CoLum. L. REv. 1486(1966); Comment, Northwest Wholesale: Group Boycott Analysis and a Role
for Procedural Safeguards in Industrial Self-Regulation, 47 OHIo ST' L.J. 729 (1986).
This Article does not address the special issues posed when a concerted refusal to deal is intended to influence
political or governmental activity. See, e.g., Superior Court Trial Lawyers' Ass'n v. FTC, 856 7.2d 226 (D.C. Cir. 1988);
Missouri v. National Organization for Women, 620 F.2d 1301 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 842 (1980); Coons,
Non-Commercial Purpose as a Sherman Act Defense, 56 Nw. U.L. REv. 705 (1962); Kennedy, Political Boycotts, the
Sherman Act, and the First Amendment: An Accommodation of Competing Interests, 55 S. CAL,. L. REv. 983 (1982).
11. On price-fixing generally, see United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150, 210-28 (1940). On
terms related to price, see Catalano, Inc. v. Target Sales, Inc., 446 U.S. 643 (1980) (credit terms). The antitrust laws
condemn some practices under all circumstances (per se illegality); other practices must be shown to have an
anticompetitive purpose or effect in particular circumstances (a "rule of reason" inquiry).
12. See Paramount Famous Lasky Corp. v. United States, 282 U.S. 30 (1930) (concerted action to compel
submission of disputes to arbitration); United States v. First Nat'l Pictures, Inc., 282 U.S. 44 (1930) (concerted action
to require security deposits); Anderson v. Shipowners Ass'n, 272 U.S. 359 (1926) (concerted action to regulate manner
of hiring seamen); Quinonez v. National Ass'n of See. Dealers, 540 F.2d 824 (5th Cir. 1976) (concerted action restricting
employment of recently discharged representatives); United States v. Hilton Hotels Corp., 467 F.2d 1000 (9th Cir. 1972),
cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1125 (1973) (concerted action to compel suppliers to contribute to a fund to attract convention
business); Union Circulation Co. v. FTC, 241 F.2d 652 (2d Cir. 1957) (concerted action restricting employment of
recently discharged representatives). But cf. Drayer v. Krasner, 572 F.2d 348, 354-55 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 436 U.S.
948 (1978) (expressing doubt as to continued vitality of Paramount Famous Lasky); Nichols v. Spencer Int'l Press, Inc.,
371 F.2d 332, 335-36 (7th Cir. 1967) (premising invalidity of employee restrictions on adverse impact in product
market). See also FTC v. Indiana Fed'n of Dentists, 476 U.S. 477 (1986) (concerted refusal to furnish x-rays to insurance
companies held to be unlawful).
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with competitors, suppliers, or customers. 13 For example, an effort by manufacturers
to maintain resale prices may be enforced by their concerted refusal to sell to
price-cutting distributors. Such conduct is unlawful per se. 14
(3) Competitors may seek to exclude from the market a particular class of rivals
by denying them access to a resource or facility needed for effective competition. The
effort, if successful, would deprive consumers of an alternative product that might be
less expensive or more attractive than the product offered by members of the
combination. Such activity has been condemned in numerous decisions.' 5
The focus of this discussion is on instances in which the consumer interest is not
implicated, at least not in any obvious way. The question is whether concerted
refusals to deal are unlawful when the only identifiable adverse impact is on the
producer disadvantaged by the concerted action.
II. THE EvOLUTION OF SUPREME COURT Docrii
Early United States Supreme Court decisions evidenced concern for producer
welfare, but the concerted actions in issue clearly affected consumers adversely. 16
The starting point of the present inquiry is the Supreme Court's 1945 opinion in
Associated Press v. United States.17
The Associated Press (AP) was a cooperative association of more than 1200
newspapers engaged in the collection, assembly and distribution of news. Some news
was generated by AP's employees and some by AP's member newspapers. Bylaws
of the Association barred members from providing AP news, including their own
spontaneously generated news, to nonmembers. They also imposed a substantial
discriminatory barrier to new membership in AP in the case of publishers competing
with existing members.' 8 In a civil action instituted by the Government, AP was
directed to provide nondiscriminatory access to membership for competitors and
noncompetitors alike. Pending revision of its procedures, AP was barred from
enforcing its requirement that AP news not be furnished to nonmembers; but this
requirement could be reinstated once the improper restrictions on membership had
been removed. The Supreme Court condemned the members' "common plan which
is bound to reduce their competitor's opportunity to buy or sell the things in which
the groups compete."' 9 The exclusive right to publish AP news "gives many
13. See, e.g., United States v. Women's Sportswear Ass'n, 336 U.S. 460 (1949); Binderup v. Pathe Exchange,
Inc., 263 U.S. 291 (1923); Montague & Co. v. Lowry, 193 U.S. 38 (1904).
14. See, e.g., Standard Sanitary Mfg. Co. v. United States, 226 U.S. 20 (1912); cf. Kiefer-Stewart Co. v. Joseph
E. Seagram & Sons, 340 U.S. 211 (1951) (refusal to sell to maintain maximum prices), overruled on another issue by
Copperweld Corp. v. Independence Tube Corp., 467 U.S. 752 (1984).
15. See, e.g., United States v. General Motors Corp., 384 U.S. 127 (1966) (exclusion of discount car outlets);
American Medical Ass'n v. United States, 317 U.S. 519 (1943) (exclusion of prepaid health services); Fashion
Originators' Guild v. FIrC, 312 U.S. 457 (1941) (exclusion of "style pirate" dress manufacturers); Eastern States Retail
Lumber Dealers' Ass'n v. United States, 234 U.S. 600 (1914) (exclusion of wholesalers also selling at retail); cf.
Associated Gen. Contractors v. California State Council of Carpenters, 459 U.S. 519, 528 (1983) (coercion in placement
of construction contracts so as to favor nonunionized employers).
16. See, e.g., Montague & Co. v. Lowry, 193 U.S. 38, 47 (1904).
17. 326 U.S. 1 (1945).
18. Id. at 4.
19. Id. at 15.
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newspapers a competitive advantage over their rivals. Conversely, a newspaper
without AP service is more than likely to be at a competitive disadvantage. ' 20
The Associated Press case, to the extent that it struck down discriminatory
membership restrictions, implements the "essential facilities" doctrines, which
requires that firms be given reasonable access to facilities considered essential to
competitive viability.21 But the case is equally significant for what it did not do.
Absent the improper membership restrictions, AP could insist that its members not
furnish AP news to nonmembers, and furnish their own spontaneous news exclu-
sively to AP, even though such conduct amounted to a concerted refusal to deal with
nonmembers. Although the point was developed only in the dissenting opinion, 22 the
permitted refusals to deal were clearly sustainable as restraints reasonably ancillary to
a legitimate joint venture.
The restrictions in Associated Press limited competition in newspaper publica-
tion in the communities served by AP members. But the Supreme Court defined no
relevant markets and refused to consider the impact of the restrictive membership
rules in limiting the access of readers to AP news.23 It was considered sufficient that
the challenged rules impaired the ability of nonmembers to compete with member
publishers. Yet the interests of consumers were not necessarily ignored. As Judge
Learned Hand had observed in the decision under review, "the interests of the
newspaper industry [are not] conclusive; for that industry serves one of the most vital
of all general interests: the dissemination of news from as many different sources, and
with as many different facets and colors as possible.''24 To find an unambiguous
vindication of producer interests, it is necessary to look beyond Associated Press.
The next significant decision was Klor's, Inc. v. Broadway-Hale Stores.25
Kor's was a San Francisco retailer engaged in the sale of refrigerators, television
sets, and other household appliances. Broadway-Hale, a department store chain,
operated a store next door, competing in the retail distribution of the same appliances.
Kor's alleged that manufacturers and distributors of major brands-such as General
Electric, RCA, and Zenith-had conspired among themselves and with Broadway-
Hale either not to sell to Klor's or to sell to it only at discriminatory prices and on
unfavorable terms. Klor's brought suit under the Sherman Act, alleging that the
conspiracy had seriously impaired its ability to compete. 26
The defendants responded by showing that "there were hundreds of other
household appliance retailers in San Francisco, some within a few blocks of Kor's
who sold many competing brands of appliances, including those that the defendants
refused to sell to Klor's." 27 The Court of Appeals affirmed summary judgment for
20. Id. at 17-18.
21. See United States v. Terminal R.R. Ass'n, 224 U.S. 383, 409-10 (1912), discussed at 326 U.S. 25 (1945)
(Frankfurter, J., concurring).
22. Associated Press, 326 U.S. at 330-38 (Roberts, J., dissenting).
23. Id. at 18.
24. United States v. Associated Press, 52 F. Supp. 362, 372 (S.D.N.Y.), aff'd, 326 U.S. 1 (1945).
25. 359 U.S. 207 (1959).
26. Id. at 209-10.
27. Id.
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the defendants, stating that "a violation of the Sherman Act requires conduct of
defendants by which the public is or conceivably may be ultimately injured.'"28 It
held that the required public injury was missing in this case because "[t]here was no
charge or proof that by any act of defendants the price, quantity, or quality offered
the public was affected, nor that there was any intent or purpose to effect a change
in, or an influence on, prices, quantity, or quality .... "29 The Supreme Court
observed that this "holding, if correct, means that unless the opportunities for
customers to buy in a competitive market are reduced, a group of powerful
businessmen may act in concert to deprive a single merchant, like Klor, of the goods
he needs to compete effectively. ' 30
The Court of Appeals' decision was reversed. The Supreme Court held that the
conduct of the defendants constituted a group boycott and was unlawful per se:
Alleged in this complaint is a wide combination consisting of manufacturers, distributors
and a retailer. This combination takes from Klor's its freedom to buy appliances in an open
competitive market and drives it out of business as a dealer in the defendants' products....
As such it is not to be tolerated merely because the victim is just one merchant whose
business is so small that his destruction makes little difference to the economy.31
Kor's was followed in short order by Radiant Burners, Inc. v. Peoples Gas
Light & Coke Co.32 Radiant Burners manufactured a ceramic gas burner for the
heating of houses and other buildings. It sought to obtain a "seal of approval" from
the American Gas Association (AGA), but was twice rejected. Without the seal, gas
utilities refused to provide gas for use in Radiant Burners' product, and potential
customers declined to buy a product for which they could not obtain gas. In bringing
suit under the Sherman Act, Radiant Burners alleged that the AGA tests were not
based on objective standards, but were influenced by AGA members, some of whom
manufactured products in competition with plaintiff; that the seal of approval had
been improperly withheld; and that the utilities refusing to supply gas also were
members of AGA. 33
The Court of Appeals affirmed dismissal of the complaint. It found no group
boycott or other per se violation and ruled that, in the absence of aper se offense, an
individual competitor may recover "only under circumstances where there is such
general injury to the competitive process that the public at large suffers economic
28. Klor's, Inc. v. Broadway-Hale Stores, Inc., 255 F.2d 214, 233 (9th Cir. 1958), rev'd, 359 U.S. 207 (1959).
29. Id. at 230.
30. Klor's, 359 U.S. at 210.
31. Id. at 212-13. The Court continued: "Monopoly can as surely thrive by the elimination of such small
businessmen, one at a time, as it can by driving them out in large groups." Id. at 213.
It should be emphasized that Kor's was decided on a motion for summary judgment. Whether the alleged conspiracy
could be proved is doubtful. Most likely, Kor's would have been able to show no more than a series of separate
agreements between Broadway-Hale and each manufacturer or distributor, in which Broadway-Hale obtained exclusivity
or preferential treatment in relation to Kior's. Such separate vertical agreements would not be subject to the ruling in the
Kior's opinion, amounting in essence to "a manufacturer and a dealer agreeing to an exclusive distributorship." Id. at
212. See, e.g., Lomar Wholesale Grocery v. Dieter's Gourmet Foods, 824 F.2d 582 (8th Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 108
S. Ct. 707 (1988).
32. 364 U.S. 656 (1961).
33. Id. at 657-59.
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harm.'' 34 Such public injury was not alleged here since "[t]he allegations of [the]
plaintiff's complaint fail to establish that there has been any appreciable lessening in
the sale of conversion gas burners or furnaces or that the public has been deprived of
a product of overall superiority. ' ' a S The Supreme Court reversed on the basis of
Klor's. "The alleged conspiratorial refusal to provide gas for use in plaintiff's
Radiant Burners [has a monopolistic tendency]. 'As such it is not to be tolerated
merely because the victim is just one [manufacturer] whose business is so small that
his destruction makes little difference to the economy.' ",36
Radiant Burners is similar to Associated Press in that the legality of the
underlying combination was not challenged. The Supreme Court did not object to the
testing of gas appliances to determine their safety. The decision turned on allegations
that the seal of approval had been improperly withheld in order to protect competitors
against the rivalry of plaintiff's product.
The most comprehensive statement of the Supreme Court's position appeared in
Silver v. New York Stock Exchange.3 7 Silver operated two registered broker-dealers
engaged in trading securities in the over-the-counter market. Neither was a member
of the New York Stock Exchange, but each had private wire connections to the
offices of several Exchange members. When the Exchange directed its members to
discontinue the private wire connections, Silver's business was substantially dimin-
ished. The Exchange declined to provide any explanation or justification for its
action. Silver sued under the Sherman Act and obtained summary judgment.38 The
Supreme Court reasoned:
The concerted action of the Exchange and its members here was . . . a group boycott
depriving petitioners of a valuable business service which they needed in order to compete
effectively.... Hence, absent any justification derived from the policy of another statute
or otherwise, the Exchange acted in violation of the Sherman Act. 39
The Court found that concerted action by Exchange members could be justified
by their statutory duty of self-regulation under the Securities Exchange Act, but it
concluded that the justification was not available in this case because of the failure of
the Exchange to provide Silver with appropriate notice and hearing.
Since the antitrust laws serve, among other things, to protect competitive freedom, i.e., the
freedom of individual business units to compete unhindered by the group action of others,
it follows that the antitrust laws are peculiarly appropriate as a check upon anticompetitive
acts of exchanges which conflict with their duty to keep their operations and those of their
members honest and viable.40 . . . The point is not that the antitrust laws impose the
requirement of notice and a hearing here, but rather that, in acting without according
petitioners these safeguards . . . , the Exchange has plainly exceeded the scope of its
34. Radiant Burners, Inc. v. Peoples Gas, Light & Coke Co., 273 F.2d 196, 200 (7th Cir. 1959), rev'd, 364 U.S.
656 (1961).
35. Id.
36. Radiant Burners, 364 U.S. at 660 (quoting Ilor's, Inc. v. Broadway-Hale Stores, Inc., 359 U.S. 207, 213
(1959)).
37. 373 U.S. 341 (1963).
38. Id. at 343-45.
39. Id. at 347-49.
40. Id. at 359-60.
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authority under the Securities Exchange Act to engage in self-regulation and therefore has
not even reached the threshold of justification under that statute for what would otherwise
be an antitrust violation. 41
At no point did the Supreme Court attach significance to the fact that Silver and
his companies were obviously very minor participants in the over-the-counter
securities market; their decline or demise could have had no impact upon the
functioning of that market. But the Court did emphasize the market power of the
Exchange and the importance of assuring that the exercise of that power was
consistent with the statutory responsibilities of the Exchange.
The next Supreme Court decision, American Society of Mechanical Engineers v.
Hydrolevel Corp. ,42 dealt with a tangential issue. The existence of an antitrust
violation was not disputed. Even so, the tenor of the opinion-and the facts with
which it was concerned-are significant.
The American Society of Mechanical Engineers (ASME), a nonprofit corpora-
tion with 90,000 members, published over 400 codes and standards governing
different aspects of engineering and industry practice. One was the Boiler and
Pressure Vessel Code, adopted by 46 states and all but one of the Canadian provinces.
The Code set forth standards for components of heating boilers, including "low-
water fuel cutoffs," which blocked the flow of fuel to the boiler before the water
level reached a dangerously low point that could lead to a "dry fire" or an explosion.
McDonnell & Miller, Inc. (M & M) was the dominant firm in low-water fuel cutoffs.
When confronted with competition from a new device manufactured by Hydrolevel,
M & M caused ASME to issue statements indicating that Hydrolevel's product did
not comply with the Code. The statements were obtained by improper activities of M
& M employees who were members of ASME committees and subcommittees.
Hydrolevel was adversely affected by the statements and brought an antitrust claim
against M & M and affiliated companies and against ASME. 43 The Supreme Court
affirmed a judgment against ASME, based on the misconduct of its agents (M & M
employees), acting within the apparent scope of their authority:
ASME wields great power in the Nation's economy. Its codes and standards influence the
policies of numerous States and cities, and ... its interpretations of its guidelines "may
result in economic prosperity or economic failure, for a number of businesses of all sizes
throughout the country," as well as entire segments of an industry .... When [ASME]
cloaks its subcommittee officials with the authority of its reputation, ASME permits those
agents to affect the destinies of businesses and thus gives them the power to frustrate
competition in the marketplace. 44
41. Id. at 364-65.
42. 456 U.S. 556 (1982).
43. Id. at 554-64.
44. Id. at 570-71 (quoting H. R. REP. No. 1981, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. 75 (1968)). The corporate defendants had
settled with Hydrolevel and were not involved in the Supreme Court proceedings.
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Apart from its comment on the dominance of M & M, the Supreme Court did not
examine the nature or extent of competition in the market for low-water fuel cutoffs
or in any other market. 45
ASME is not a conventional boycott case. But it is obviously similar in purport
to Radiant Burners. The Supreme Court did not question the validity of the group's
safety standards program, but it sustained an antitrust judgment against ASME and its
members when the program was improperly manipulated for the benefit of one
competitor at the expense of another.
The Supreme Court's most recent articulation on the issue at hand is Northwest
Wholesale Stationers v. Pacific Stationery & Printing Co.46 Northwest was a
purchasing cooperative made up of approximately 100 office supply retailers in the
Pacific Northwest. The cooperative acted as a wholesaler for the retailer members and
for other retailers as well. All retailers purchased at the same price from Northwest,
but members received a percentage rebate representing a share of Northwest's profits.
Northwest also provided some warehousing facilities for members. "The cooperative
arrangement thus [permitted] the participating retailers to achieve economies of scale
in purchasing and warehousing that would otherwise [be] unavailable to them."-47
Pacific was a member of Northwest. It sold office supplies at both the wholesale and
retail levels. Following a change in its ownership, Pacific was expelled from
membership in Northwest. Pacific argued that the expulsion was the result of
Pacific's decision to maintain wholesale operations. Northwest contended that the
expulsion resulted from Pacific's failure to notify cooperative members of the change
in its ownership. There was no notice or hearing, and Pacific was given no
opportunity to challenge the expulsion decision. As a result of the expulsion, Pacific
lost annual rebates approximating $10,000, but there were no other "allegations
indicating the nature and extent of competitive injury the expulsion [had] caused
Pacific to suffer.' 48
In its antitrust suit under the Sherman Act, Pacific prevailed in the Court of
Appeals on summary judgment on the ground that Northwest had failed to provide
appropriate procedural safeguards as required by Silver. The Supreme Court
reversed. It viewed Silver as the product of a need "to accommodate the important
national policy of promoting effective exchange self-regulation, tempered by the
principle that the Sherman Act should be narrowed only to the extent necessary to
effectuate that policy .... 49 In this case, there was no need "to accommodate any
competing congressional policy requiring discretionary self-policing." '50
45. The Second Circuit, from which the case had been appealed, found a violation without examining market
impact: "Given the effect and intent of IM & M's actions,] the restraint was surely unreasonable: it intentionally
misinterpreted the Code so as to prevent Hydrolevel from selling its product." Hydrolevel Corp. v. American Soc'y of
Mechanical Eng'rs, 635 F.2d 118, 124 (2d Cir. 1980), aff'd. 456 U.S. 556 (1982).
46. 472 U.S. 284 (1985).
47. Id. at 286-87.
48. Id. at 287.
49. Id. at 292.
50. Id. at 293.
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In any event, the absence of procedural safeguards can in no sense determine the antitrust
analysis. If the challenged concerted activity of Northwest's members would amount to a per
se violation of § 1 of the Sherman Act, no amount of procedural protection would save it.
If the challenged action would not amount to a violation of § 1, no lack of procedural
protections would convert it into a per se violation because the antitrust laws do not
themselves impose on joint ventures a requirement of process. 5'
Turning to the question of whether the decision to expel Pacific could be held
unlawful per se as a group boycott, the Court observed that cases finding per se
illegality
generally involved joint efforts by a firm or firms to disadvantage competitors by "either
directly denying or persuading or coercing suppliers or customers to deny relations the
competitors need in the competitive struggle.".. . See, e.g., Silver... (denial of necessary
access to exchange members); Radiant Burners . . . (denial of necessary certification of
product); Associated Press ... (denial of important sources of news); Klor's ... (denial of
wholesale supplies). In these cases, the boycott often cut off access to a supply, facility, or
market necessary to enable the boycotted firm to compete .... and frequently the boycotting
firms possessed a dominant position in the relevant market .... In addition, the practices
were generally not justified by plausible arguments that they were intended to enhance
overall efficiency and make markets more competitive. Under such circumstances the
likelihood of anticompetitive effects is clear and the possibility of countervailing procom-
petitive effects is remote. 52
The Court observed that wholesale purchasing cooperatives like Northwest "are
not a form of concerted activity characteristically likely to result in predominantly
anticompetitive effects. 53 Rather, such cooperative arrangements were designed to
increase economic efficiency-by affording economies of scale in purchasing and
warehousing and more ready access to merchandise on short notice-and rendered
markets more, rather than less, competitive, by enabling smaller retailers to reduce
prices and maintain stock "so as to compete more effectively with large retailers. "54
As to the expulsion itself, the Court found that the disclosure requirements were
related to the effective functioning of the cooperative, and observed that the "act of
expulsion from a wholesale cooperative does not necessarily imply anticompetitive
animus and thereby raise a probability of anticompetitive effect." 5 5 Moreover, unless
the cooperative "possesses market power or exclusive access to an element essential
to effective competition, the conclusion that expulsion is virtually always likely to
have an anticompetitive effect is not warranted. . . . At no time has Pacific made a
threshold showing that these structural characteristics are present in this case.''56
51. Id.
52. Id. at 294 (quoting L. Sunv.A, supra note 10, at § 92).
53. Id. at 295.
54. Id.
55. Id. at 296.
56. Id. at 296-97. Referring to Pacific's argument that Northwest's motive in the expulsion was to place Pacific
at a competitive disadvantage in retaliation for Pacific's decision to engage in independent wholesale operations, the Court
described this purpose as "more troubling" than the justification given by Northwest. "If Northwest's action were not
substantially related to the efficiency-enhancing or procompetitive purposes that otherwise justify the cooperative's
practices, an inference of anticompetitive animus might be appropriate. But such an argument is appropriately evaluated
under the rule of reason analysis." Id. at 296 n.7. The Government's amicus brief, which urged reversal in this case,
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Accordingly, the Supreme Court concluded that case should be judged under a "rule
of reason" analysis, rather than held unlawful under the per se rule, and remanded
the case for further proceedings.
Northwest Wholesale Stationers makes explicit the point implicit in Associated
Press-that a concerted refusal to deal may be lawful if reasonably ancillary to a
legitimate joint venture. It emphasizes the element of market power, but it does not
state that market power is essential in all cases. Most troublesome is the Court's
discussion of the procedural aspects of the expulsion. Surely there are cases (apart
from the statutory self-regulation of the Silver case) in which the outcome will be
strongly influenced by the propriety of procedures. In ASME, for example, it is
inconceivable that antitrust liability could turn on a judicial determination that a
boiler component was in fact safe, when the relevant trade association had reached a
contrary conclusion on the basis of impartial (but erroneous) testing.
Most significantly, nothing in Northwest Wholesale Stationers conflicts with the
proposition that a concerted refusal to deal may be condemned as unlawful if it
impairs the ability of a producer to compete, without regard to possible impact on
consumers, if the impairment is not justified by legitimate business reasons.
m. CONCERTED REFUSALS IN THE LOWER COURTS
Concurrent with the evolution of Supreme Court doctrine, the lower federal
courts actively participated in developing antitrust responses to concerted refusals to
deal-encompassing important areas of economic activity not touched by Supreme
Court precedents directly on point.
In cases involving organized sports, the federal courts have taken the position
that self-regulation is necessary to the success of the joint venture. Some of the
restrictions adopted by sports organizations have been sustained, 57 some have been
stated: "Membership restrictions drawn with the sole purpose of injuring rivals would of course be inherently suspect as
'naked' restraints on competition." Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae at 16 n.14, Northwest Wholesale
Stationers, 472 U.S. 284 (No. 83-1368).
57. See Brenner v. World Boxing Council, 675 F.2d 445 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 835 (1982) (suspension
of fight promoter for improper practices); Neeld v. National Hockey League, 594 F.2d 1297 (9th Cir. 1979) (exclusion
of player because of physical infirmity); Hennessey v. National Collegiate Athletic Ass'n, 564 F.2d 1136 (5th Cir. 1977)
(limitation on number of assistant coaches); Bridge Corp. of America v. American Contract Bridge League, 428 F.2d
1365 (9th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 940 (1971) (exclusion of equipment found unsuitable); Deesen v.
Professional Golfers' Ass'n, 358 F.2d 165 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 846 (1966) (exclusion of player because of
lack of skill); Gunter Harz Sports, Inc. v. United States Tennis Ass'n, 511 F. Supp. 1103 (D. Neb.), aff'd per curiam,
665 F.2d 222 (8th Cir. 1981) (exclusion of equipment found unsuitable); Brant v. United States Polo Ass'n, 631 F. Supp.
71 (S.D. Fla. 1986) (suspension of player for abusive language; denial of preliminary injunction); Cooney v. American
Horse Shows Ass'n, 495 F. Supp. 424 (S.D.N.Y. 1980) (suspension of trainer because of improper practices); College
Athletic Placement Service v. National Collegiate Athletic Ass'n, 1975 CCH Trade Cases 60,117 (D.N.J.), affd mem.,
506 F.2d 1050 (3d Cir. 1974) (exclusion of commercial firms assisting in obtaining college athletic scholarships); STP
Corp. v. United States Auto Club, Inc., 286 F. Supp. 146 (S.D. Ind. 1968) (equipment specifications); Molinas v.
National Basketball Ass'n, 190 F. Supp. 241 (S.D.N.Y. 1961) (exclusion of player because of gambling).
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invalidated5s and some have been remanded for further hearings. 59 For present
purposes, the most significant aspect of these opinions is their focus on the plight of
the individual competitor. For example, in Denver Rockets v. All-Pro Management,60
an athlete had been excluded by the National Basketball Association. 61 The court
described the resulting harm:
First, the victim of the boycott is injured by being excluded from the market he seeks to
enter. Second, competition in the market in which the victim attempts to sell his services [the
players' market] is injured. Third, by pooling their economic power, the individual members
of the NBA have, in effect, established their own private government. Of course, this is true
only where [as here] the members of the combination possess market power in a degree
approaching a shared monopoly. 62
The court ruled that, to support the exclusion of an athlete from competition, the
NBA must meet these standards:
(1) [The case must be one in which] self-regulation is inherently required by the market's
structure....
(2) The collective action is intended to (a) accomplish an end consistent with the policy
justifying self-regulation, (b) is reasonably related to that goal, and (c) is no more extensive
than necessary.
(3) The association provides procedural safeguards which assure that the restraint is not
arbitrary and which furnishes a basis for judicial review. 63
A different approach was adopted in Levin v. National BasketballAssociation.64
Prospective purchasers of a basketball team were rejected by the NBA on grounds of
conflict of interest. Plaintiffs claimed that the real reason was personal animosity. 65
The court granted summary judgment for the defendant, ruling that, whatever the
basis for rejection, there was no antitrust violation. "Here the plaintiffs wanted to
join with those unwilling to accept them, not to compete with them, but to be partners
with them in the operation of a sports league for plaintiffs' profit." 66 The court found
58. See Smith v. Pro Football, Inc., 593 F.2d 1173 (D.C. Cir. 1978) (unreasonable restrictions on player mobility);
Mackey v. National Football League, 543 F.2d 606 (8th Cir. 1976), cert. dismissed, 434 U.S. 801 (1977) (unreasonable
restrictions on player mobility); Washington State Bowling Proprietors Ass'n v. Pacific Lanes, Inc., 356 F.2d 371 (9th
Cir.), cert. denied, 384 U.S. 963 (1966) (exclusion of nonmember establishments from organized bowling); Kapp v.
National Football League, 390 F. Supp. 73 (N.D. Cal. 1974), other issues in 586 F. 2d 644 (9th Cir. 1978), cert. denied,
441 U.S. 907 (1979) (unreasonable restrictions on player mobility); Robertson v. National Basketball Ass'n, 389 F. Supp.
867 (S.D.N.Y. 1975) (unreasonable restrictions on player mobility); Blalock v. Ladies Professional Golf Ass'n, 359 F.
Supp. 1260 (N.D. Ga. 1973) (exclusion of player without following proper procedures). See also North American Soccer
League v. National Football League, 670 F.2d 1249 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1074 (1982) (restriction on
ownership of soccer teams by NFL owners held unlawful on the basis of adverse impact on market).
59. See Radovich v. National Football League, 352 U.S. 445 (1957); Gardella v. Chandler, 172 F.2d 402 (2d Cir.
1949); Phone Programs Illinois, Inc. v. National Jockey Club, 692 F. Supp. 879 (N.D. 111. 1988); Linseman v. World
Hockey Ass'n, 439 F. Supp. 1315 (D. Conn. 1977); Nassau Sports v. Hampson, 355 F. Supp. 733 (D. Minn. 1972);
Philadelphia World Hockey Club v. Philadelphia Hockey Club, 351 F. Supp. 462 (E.D. Pa. 1972); Boston Professional
Hockey Ass'n v. Cheever, 348 F. Supp. 261 (D. Mass. 1972), other issues in 472 F.2d 127 (Ist Cir. 1972).
60. 325 F. Supp. 1049 (C.D. Cal. 1971).
61. Id. at 1054.
62. Id. at 1061.
63. Id. at 1064-65.
64. 385 F. Supp. 149 (S.D.N.Y. 1974).
65. Id. at 150-51.
66. Id. at 152. See also Catrone v. Ogden Suffolk Downs, Inc., 683 F. Supp. 302 (D. Mass. 1988). The court
rejected the antitrust complaint of a horse trainer barred from local racetracks by concerted action of the owners, holding
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that there was neither anticompetitive purpose nor effect, and affirmed that the
purpose of the antitrust laws was to protect competition, not competitors.
The two cases are reconcilable on their facts. Prospective owners may be viewed
as seeking a partnership relation, and standards for association on that basis may well
be selective and subjective. Moreover, the rejected applicant has other outlets for
capital investment. The rejected player, by contrast, is foreclosed from a field of
occupational endeavor in a relationship that has none of the characteristics of a
partnership. Denver Rockets is typical of cases involving organized sports; Levin is
the exception.
Competing firms may lawfully act in concert in other contexts if the purpose is
to achieve partial integration of operations and there is no unreasonable impact on
competition. Two or more firms may elect to use a common distributor 67 or
transportation service, 68 to jointly procure insurance 69 or supplies, 70 or to perform a
clearinghouse function. 71 The selection of one mode of operation (e.g., one
distributor) excludes other possible candidates. The exclusion is not normally
actionable. Nor is the selection of an exclusive distributor by a single firm (or group
of affiliated firns). 72 In each instance, the excluded firms remain free to seek
patronage of others in the market. 73
Greater scrutiny is required when the joint activity controls access to a market.
Tobacco boards of trade regulate the selling time of warehouses in discrete
geographical areas; if the allocation of time unreasonably favors some warehouses
over others, the ability of the disadvantaged warehouses to compete is improperly
that the trainer must show that the challenged conduct "was injurious to the competitive process"; it was not enough for
plaintiff to show "injury to him alone." Id. at 307. The decision is unsound. See discussion at infra notes 79-81 and
90-93.
67. Joseph E. Seagram & Sons, Inc. v. Hawaiian Oke & Liquors, Ltd., 416 F.2d 71 (9th Cir. 1969), cert. denied,
396 U.S. 1062 (1970); Interborough News Co. v. Curtis Publishing Co., 225 F.2d 289 (2d Cir. 1955); cf. Topps Chewing
Gum v. Major League Players Ass'n, 641 F. Supp. 1179 (S.D.N.Y. 1986).
68. Instant Delivery Corp. v. City Stores, 284 F. Supp. 941 (E.D. Pa. 1968); Parnelee Transp. Co. v. Keeshin,
186 F. Supp. 533 (N.D. Ill. 1960), aff'd, 292 F.2d 794 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 944 (1961); cf. International
Rys. of Central America v. United Brands, 532 F.2d 231 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 835 (1976).
69. Ackerman-Chillingworth v. Pacific Elec. Contractors Ass'n, 579 F.2d 484 (9th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 439
U.S. 1089 (1979).
70. M & H Tire Co. v. Hoosier Racing Corp., 733 F.2d 973 (1st Cir. 1984); Langston Corp. v. Standard Register
Co., 553 F. Supp. 632 (N.D. Ga. 1982).
71. Worthen Bank & Trust Co. v. National Bancamericard Inc., 485 F.2d 119 (8th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 415
U.S. 918 (1974); Florists' Nationwide Tel. Delivery Network v. Florists' Tel. Delivery Ass'n, 371 F.2d 263 (7th Cir.),
cert. denied, 387 U.S. 909 (1967); American Floral Servs. v. Florists' Transworld Delivery Ass'n, 633 F. Supp. 201
(N.D. 111. 1986).
72. See Bruce Drug, Inc. v. Hollister, Inc., 688 F.2d 853 (Ist Cir. 1982); Borger v. Yamaha Int'l Corp., 625 F.2d
390 (2d Cir. 1980); Oreck Corp. v. Whirlpool Corp., 579 F.2d 126 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 946 (1978); Mutual
Fund Investors v. Putnam Management Co., 553 F.2d 620 (9th Cir. 1977); Bushie v. Stenocord Corp., 460 F.2d 116 (9th
Cir. 1972); Packard Motor Car Co. v. Webster Motor Car Co., 243 F.2d 418 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 355 U.S. 822
(1957). But cf. Coin-Tel v. DuKane Corp., 669 F.2d 404 (6th Cir. 1982); Cernuto, Inc. v. United Cabinet Corp., 595
F.2d 164 (3d Cir. 1979) (price-fixing alleged).
73. For examples of partial integration, see Charley's Taxi Radio Dispatch v. SIDA of Hawaii, Inc., 810 F.2d 869
(9th Cir. 1987) (jointly held franchise to provide taxi service at airport); Phil Tolkan Datsun v. Greater Milwaukee Datsun
Dealers' Advertising Ass'n, 672 F.2d 1280 (7th Cir. 1982) (joint advertising campaign); United States Trotting Ass'n v.
Chicago Downs Ass'n, 665 F.2d 781 (7th Cir. 1981) (joint preparation of racing information); E.A. MeQuade Tours v.
Consolidated Air Tour Manual Comm., 467 F.2d 178 (5th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1109 (1973) (joint
preparation of manual listing package tours).
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impaired. 74 Similarly, if access to a multiple listing service is necessary to compete
effectively in local real estate markets, participation must be provided to all agents on
reasonable terms. 75 The same is true of other facilities needed for effective
competition. 76
In instances of industry self-regulation, including the testing of products,
standards must be fairly drawn and properly applied. 77 As one court observed, the
association "holds the reputations and the livelihood of its members within its
absolute grasp." ' 78 The driving force in all of these cases is protection of the
disadvantaged competitor. Consumer interests are rarely mentioned and in most cases
appear to be at the periphery of judicial concern.
A contrary view has been expressed in a few cases. In Products Liability
Insurance Agency v. Crum & Foster Insurance Companies,79 an insurance broker
complained of exclusion from the market as the result of a conspiracy between a rival
broker and a group of affiliated insurance companies.8 0 The Seventh Circuit, treating
the arrangement as similar to an exclusive distributorship, found no antitrust
violation. Judge Posner reasoned:
Now there is a sense in which eliminating even a single competitor reduces competition.
But it is not the sense that is relevant in deciding whether the antitrust laws have been
violated. Those laws... are designed to protect the consumer interest in competition....
The consumer does not care how many sellers of a particular good or service there are; he
74. Bale v. Glasgow Tobacco Board of Trade, 339 F.2d 281 (6th Cir. 1964); Danville Tobacco Ass'n v.
Bryant-Buckner Associates, Inc., 333 F.2d 202 (4th Cir. 1964), second opinion, 372 F.2d 634 (4th Cir.), cert. denied,
387 U.S. 907 (1967); Asheville Tobacco Board of Trade v. FrC, 263 F.2d 502 (4th Cir. 1959), second opinion, 294 F.2d
619 (4th Cir. 1961); Rogers v. Douglas Tobacco Board of Trade, 244 F.2d 471 (5th Cir. 1957), second opinion, 266 F.2d
636 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 361 U.S. 833 (1959); American Fed'n of Tobacco Growers v. Neal, 183 F.2d 869 (4th Cir.
1950).
75. United States v. Realty Multi-List, Inc., 629 F.2d 1351 (5th Cir. 1980) (discussing prior cases). See also
O'Riordan v. Long Island Board of Realtors, 1988-2 CCH Trade Cases 68,248 (E.D.N.Y. Sept. 19, 1988) (conditions
of membership in multiple listing service sustained as reasonable).
76. See Mechanical Contractors Bid Depository v. Christiansen, 352 F.2d 817 (10th Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 384
U.S. 918 (1966) (bid depository); United States v. Southwestern Greyhound Lines, 1953 CCH Trade Cases 1 67,470
(N.D. Okla. 1953) (bus terminal).
77. Industry self-regulation was sustained in Vogel v. American Soc'y of Appraisers, 744 F.2d 598 (7th Cir. 1984)
(pricing methods); ECOS Elec. Corp. v. Underwriters Laboratories, 743 F.2d 498 (7th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 469 U.S.
1210 (1985) (product testing); Eliason Corp. v. National Sanitation Found., 614 F.2d 126 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 449
U.S. 826 (1980) (product testing); Hatley v. American Quarter Horse Ass'n, 552 F.2d 646 (5th Cir. 1977) (registration
of horses); Paralegal Inst. v. American Bar Ass'n, 475 F. Supp. 1123 (E.D.N.Y. 1979), aff'd mem., 622 F.2d 575 (2d
Cir. 1980) (accreditation of schools); Cullum Elec. & Mechanical Inc. v. Mechanical Contractors Ass'n, 436 F. Supp.
418 (D.S.C. 1976), aff'd, 569 F.2d 821 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 910 (1978) (bidding regulations); Ve-Ri-Tas,
Inc. v. Advertising Review Council, 411 F. Supp. 1012 (D. Colo. 1976), aff'd, 567 F.2d 963 (10th Cir. 1977), cert.
denied, 436 U.S. 906 (1978) (review of advertising); Tropic Film Corp. v. Paramount Pictures, 319 F. Supp. 1247
(S.D.NY. 1970) (motion picture ratings); Structural Laminates, Inc. v. Douglas Fir Plywood Ass'n, 261 F. Supp. 154
(D. Ore. 1966), aff'dper curiam, 399 F.2d 155 (9th Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 1024 (1969) (product standards);
Roofire Alarm Co. v. Royal Indemnity Co., 202 F. Supp. 166 (E.D. Tenn. 1962), aff'd per curiam, 313 F.2d 635 (6th
Cir.), cert. denied, 373 U.S. 949 (1963) (product testing); Hughes Tool Co. v. Motion Pictures Ass'n, 66 F. Supp. 1006
(S.D.N.Y. 1946) (motion picture advertising); cf. Moore v. Boating Indus. Ass'n, 819 F.2d 693 (7th Cir.), cert. denied,
108 S. Ct. 160 (1987) (nature of certification program not clear).
78. McCreery Angus Farmis v. American Angus Ass'n, 379 F. Supp. 1008 (S.D. 1I.), aff'dmem., 506 F.2d 1404
(7th Cir. 1974) (preliminary injunction granted at behest of breeder). See also Indian Head, Inc. v. Allied Tube & Conduit
Corp., 817 F.2d 938 (2d Cir. 1987), aff'd, 108 S. Ct. 1931 (1988) (jury verdict sustained against participant in standard
setting organization).
79. 682 F.2d 660 (7th Cir. 1982).
80. Id. at 661-62.
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cares only that there be enough to assure him a competitive price and quality. It thus would
not be enough to show that [plaintiff had been excluded]. No inference could be drawn that
the result of excluding [plaintiff] would be to raise the price, or diminish the quality, of
product liability insurance .... 81
The result in Products Liability is consistent with the prevailing view on
exclusive distributorships. But to the extent that the opinion would permit concerted
actions against an individual firm-impairing that firm's ability to compete-on the
ground that consumer interests are not adversely affected, the opinion is inconsistent
with prevailing Supreme Court precedents.
The issue is of particular importance in the health care industries and has been
extensively litigated in that context, because access to a hospital or professional
society or insurance program may be critical to the ability of a worker or business to
compete.
In Weiss v. York Hospital,82 an osteopath (D.O.) applied for staff privileges at
York Hospital and was rejected. He brought a class action against the hospital on
behalf of himself and osteopaths similarly situated, alleging Sherman Act
violations.8 3 The jury found that the hospital and its medical staff "had engaged in
a policy of discrimination against Dr. Weiss and the other D.O.s in the York MSA
by applying unfair, unequal, and unreasonable procedures in reviewing their
applications,"' 84 and the district court concluded that "this unfair, unreasonable, and
unequal treatment 'could reasonably be anticipated to cause osteopathic physicians to
refrain from applying for staff privileges at the York hospital.' "5 The Third Circuit
concluded that the conduct of the defendants constituted a group boycott and was
unlawful per se:
We recognize that the facts of this case do not precisely fit into the mold of the classical
refusal to deal. The refusal to deal is not total insofar as York admitted Dr. Zittle and a
number of other osteopaths .... Arguably then, what is at issue is not a boycott but mere
discrimination which sounds less like a per se antitrust violation. However, given the
evidence of the different standards applied to osteopaths and M.D.s and the second class
citizenship afforded D.O.s upon admission to staff privileges at York, and in view of the
adverse impact of these factors upon D.O. applications for York staff privileges, we are
satisfied that the restrictive policy is, in purpose and effect, sufficiently close to the
traditional boycott, that the characterization is appropriate.86
The court recognized that individual doctors could be rejected on the basis of
their lack of professional competence, and that such individual exclusions would have
to be reviewed under the rule of reason. In this case, however, there was no
contention of lack of competence or any other "legitimate explanation for the
discrimination." 87
81. Id. at 663-64.
82. 745 F.2d 786 (3d Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 470 U.S. 1060 (1985).
83. Id. at 791-93.
84. Id. at 818 (quoting Weiss v. York Hospital, 548 F. Supp. 1048, 1053 (M.D. Pa. 1982)).
85. Id.
86. Id. at 819-20.
87. Id. at 820.
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The appellate court found that York Hospital occupied a monopoly position in
the York MSA, 88 and that its medical staff was apparently motivated by anticom-
petitive animus. Yet it made no finding as to the actual or probable impact of the
challenged practice on the market for physician services.8 9 Individual osteopaths
were found to have sustained injury, but there were no detailed findings as to injury
to competition.
A contrasting position was enunciated in Marrese v. American Academy of
Orthopaedic Surgeons.9° Plaintiffs, orthopaedic surgeons, contended that their
exclusion from Academy membership impaired their ability to compete with surgeons
who were members. 9' The Seventh Circuit refused to permit the plaintiffs to go
forward with discovery of the Academy's records until they had shown a probable
anticompetitive effect. Judge Posner reasoned:
Assume that the market for orthopaedic surgery is local .... The plaintiffs will ... have
the burden at trial of showing that in these local markets the number of orthopaedic surgeons
who belong to the Academy is so few that competition among them . . . cannot be relied
upon to give the consuming public the benefits of competition. Unless they can show this
they will be unable to ask the trier of fact to draw an inference that either the exclusion of
an individual orthopaedist from a local market or the possible effect of that exclusion on the
competitive behavior of other aspirants to membership could result in a higher price or lower
quality of orthopaedic surgery in these communities.92
It is arguable, particularly after Northwest Wholesale Stationers, that an
exclusion from health care facilities or organizations should be actionable only in the
event that the defendant controls access to the market or some resource significant for
effective competition. 93 But Marrese goes too far in requiring an additional showing
88. Id. at 827. The court did not reach the question "whether, in order to constitute a per se illegal boycott, a
conspiracy to exclude a group of potential competitors from hospital staff privileges requires that the hospital... possess
substantial market power in the relevant market. This distinguishing factor might render the analysis in this case different
from the analysis in a large metropolitan area." Id. at 819 n.58.
89. The district court had made findings, in accordance with the jury's verdict, that defendants had unreasonably
restrained interstate commerce. Weiss, 548 F. Supp. at 1052. The Court of Appeals held in the alternative that, even under
the rule of reason, an unreasonable restraint could be found, because: "(1) Weiss met his burden of production and
persuasion that the purpose and effect of the defendants' discriminatory conduct was to 'foreclose so much of the market
from penetration by [the M.D.s'] competitors [i.e., the D.O.s] as to unreasonably restrain competition in the affected
market .. . ' and (2) the defendants... made no attempt to counter the evidence." Weiss, 745 F.2d at 822 n.61. There
were, however, no detailed findings, in the decision of either the district court or the Court of Appeals, as to the extent
to which the price, quality, or quantity of physician services had been affected.
90. 706 F.2d 1488 (7th Cir. 1983), modified, 726 F.2d 1150 (7th Cir. 1984), rev'd on other grounds, 470 U.S.
373 (1985).
91. Id. at 1492.
92. Id. at 1497.
93. See Hahn v. Oregon Physicians' Serv., 860 F.2d 1501 (9th Cir. 1988); Goss v. Memorial Hospital System, 789
F.2d 353 (5th Cir. 1986); Rickards v. Canine Eye Registration Found., 783 F.2d 1329 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 479 U.S.
851 (1986); Registered Physical Therapists v. Intermountain Health Care, 1988-2 CCH Trade Cases 68,233 (D. Utah
Sept. 6, 1988).
For other decisions concerned with exclusions from health care organizations and facilities, see Kreuzer v. American
Academy of Periodontology, 735 F.2d 1479 (D.C.Cir. 1984); Wilk v. American Medical Ass'n, 719 F.2d 207 (7th Cir.
1983), cert. denied, 467 U.S. 1210 (1984); St. Bernard Gen. Hospital v. Hospital Serv. Ass'n, 712 F.2d 978 (5th Cir.
1983), cert. denied, 466 U.S. 970 (1984); Virginia Academy of Clinical Psychologists v. Blue Shield, 624 F.2d 476 (4th
Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 916 (1981); Feminists Women's Health Center v. Mohammad, 586 F.2d 530 (5th Cir.
1978), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 924 (1979); Ballard v. Blue Shield, 543 F.2d 1074 (4th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 430 U.S.
922 (1977); Koefoot v. American College of Surgeons, 652 F. Supp. 882 (N.D. Ill. 1986); Reazin v. Blue Cross, 635
88 OHIO STATE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 50:73
of impairment of competition in the market for the services of the excluded
participant. Whether the number of orthopaedic surgeons is large or small, individual
participants should be protected against arbitrary exclusion.
IV. A CRITIQUE OF THE NEW ORTHODOXY
The New Orthodoxy asserts that antitrust is concerned exclusively with
consumer welfare; producers have no standing to complain unless they can point to
some adverse impact on consumers. The position is wrong on two counts: (1) there
is no basis for claiming that consumer welfare is the sole objective of antitrust; and
(2) efforts to rigorously segregate producer and consumer interests encounter severe,
and perhaps insurmountable, methodological problems.
A. The Objectives of Antitrust
On the objectives of antitrust, there has been a wide-ranging debate. 94 This
Article does not address all aspects of that controversy; the issue at hand is more
narrowly focused. At a minimum, it is plain that the antitrust laws were intended to
promote and preserve competitive markets; and the beneficiaries of such competition
were to be producers as well as consumers. The passage of the Sherman Act was
strongly influenced by injuries inflicted upon business firms; they were among the
most obvious victims of the trusts. 95 The protection of producer interests was even
more apparent in the passage of subsequent legislation: the Clayton96 and FTC Acts97
of 1914, the Robinson-Patman Act of 193698 and the Celler-Kefauver Act of 1950.99
At the very least, these statutes stand for the proposition that business firms are
among the intended beneficiaries of the competitive regime to be supported and
sustained by antitrust.1° °
F. Supp. 1287 (D. Kan. 1986), second opinion, 663 F. Supp. 1360 (D. Kan. 1987); Robinson v. Magovern, 521 F. Supp.
842 (W.D. Pa. 1981), aff'd mem., 688 F.2d 824 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 971 (1982); Nankin Hospital v.
Michigan Hospital Serv., 361 F. Supp. 1199 (E.D. Mich. 1973). See also Patrick v. Burget, 108 S. Ct. 1658 (1988)
(exclusion of doctor from hospital held actionable under antitrust notwithstanding defense based on state regulation).
94. See supra note 9.
95. On the political, economic, and legislative history of the Sherman Act, see, e.g., W. Latwes, LAw AND
EcoNoMc PoItcY iN AmmucA: THE EvoLUIoN OF Tim Snmt.tw ATTusr Acr (1965); H. THoRmTu, THE FEDEn.
ANerrRusT PoLicY (1954); Lande, Wealth Transfers as the Original and Primary Concern of Antitrust: The Efficiency
Interpretation Challenged, 34 HArm, s LJ. 65, 82-106 (1982).
96. 15 U.S.C. §§ 12-27, 44 (1982 & Supp. IV. 1987); 29 U.S.C.A. § 52 (1973).
97. 15 U.S.C. §§ 41-51, 52-58 (1982 & Supp. IV. 1987).
98. 15 U.S.C. §§ 13-13c, 21a (1982 & Supp. IV. 1987).
99. 15 U.S.C. §§ 18, 21 (1982 & Supp. IV. 1987). See G. HENDERSON, THE FEDERAL. R'ADa CoMMPssioN 11-48
(1924); Bok, Section 7 of the Clayton Act and the Merging of Law and Economics, 74 HARv. L. REv. 226,228-38 (1960);
Hansen, Robinson-Patman Law: A Review andAnalysis, 51 FORD. L. Rv. 1113, 1120-24 (1983); Lande, supra note 95,
at 106-42.
100. In the Foreign Trade Antitrust Improvement Act of 1982, 15 U.S.C.A. § 6a (Supp. 1988), Congress reaffirmed
its commitment to protect the interests of individual competitors. In cases not affecting domestic markets or imports into
the United States, the antitrust laws may be invoked where the challenged behavior has an effect on the export trade or
commerce "of a person engaged in such trade or commerce in the United States" to the extent of "injury to export
business in the United States." Thus, the antitrust laws are made applicable in cases in which the welfare of U.S.
consumers is assumed not to be adversely affected. The provision is intended to protect individual competitors. See House
Rep. No. 686, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 7-8, 11-12 (1982); House Conf. Rep. No. 924, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 29-30 (1982).
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Nor is the protection of producers incompatible with an emphasis on competi-
tion. Competitive markets generate opportunities for both producers and consumers.
Consumers may choose among different products and may purchase at competitive
prices and under competitive conditions. Likewise, producers may choose among
different markets and may sell at competitive prices and under competitive condi-
tions. There is no justification for assuming that the right of one is superior to the
right of the other. The opportunity to sell at competitive prices has been protected as
zealously as the opportunity to buy at competitive prices; antitrust condemns
interference with price by either buyers or sellers. 10 Moreover, there is something
amiss with an argument that consumers have a protected interest in purchasing sticks
of chewing gum at competitive prices, but the very same persons-in their capacities
as producers-may be excluded by combinations from the right to pursue an
occupation or earn a living.
The protection of producer interests is not incompatible with the attainment of
economic efficiency. Consumers are not entitled to every product that might
conceivably be produced, nor access to every channel of distribution that might
conceivably be utilized. A professional sports league may decide that franchises will
be granted in some cities but not in others, and that the number of contests will be
fifteen or fifty or one hundred and fifty. Individual consumers might wish to have a
team in a non-franchised city, or to have a larger number of contests. But the efficient
operation of a sports league requires that there be defined limits on operations, and
dissatisfied consumers have no legitimate claim under the antitrust laws if the league
performs the functions for which it was formed.
The same reasoning applies to producers. To the extent that joint operation is
justified by considerations of efficiency, and exclusion is required to maintain
efficient operations, the excluded producer cannot complain. To return to the
example of the professional sports league, players cannot complain about exclusions
premised on conduct incompatible with the efficient conduct of league operations-
gambling, for example, that might taint the league in the eyes of the public. But
exclusions unrelated to efficiency are another matter. The interest of the producer in
pursuing an occupation is one of the oldest interests recognized in antitrust.102
In sum, restrictions premised on concerted action may injure consumers or
producers. Neither has a right to complain if the objective of the action is to achieve
enhanced economic efficiency and the restriction is reasonably ancillary to that goal.
But if economic efficiency is not the objective, or if the restriction is not reasonably
related to that objective, then both producers and consumers have protectible interests
under antitrust. The recent case of National Collegiate Athletic Association v. Board
of Regents 0 3 provides an example. The Supreme Court condemned restrictions that
101. See supra note 8.
102. See Gardella v. Chandler, 172 F.2d 402, 408 (2d Cir. 1949) (Learned Hand, J.): "[W]hatever other conduct
the [Antitrust] Acts may forbid, they certainly forbid all restraints of trade which were unlawful at common law, and one
of the oldest and best established of these is a contract which unreasonably forbids any one to practice his calling." See
also Blake, Employee Agreements Not to Compete, 73 HARV. L. REv. 625 (1960).
103, 468 U.S. 85 (1984).
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the NCAA had imposed on the televising of college football games. The interests of
consumers were adversely affected by the restrictions and provided a basis for the
Court's decision. But the Court found the restrictions detrimental, "not only for
television viewers, but also for athletes. [Increased television exposure] means that
smaller institutions appealing to essentially local or regional markets would get more
exposure if the plan is enjoined, enhancing their ability to compete for student
athletes." 104 There is simply no basis for the assertion that antitrust is concerned
solely with the protection of consumer interests.105
B. The Separation of Producer and Consumer Interests
Efforts to sharply differentiate between the interests of consumers and the
interests of producers present another problem. For example, Radiant Burners and
ASME involved the exclusion of new products. Were consumers injured by the
exclusion? Absent a market assessment of the merit of the excluded product, it is
impossible to say whether consumers were deprived of a significant innovation or an
insignificant variation. The point is that such issues are to be resolved by the
untrammeled interplay of market forces. The benefit to consumers cannot be
ascertained until the process has run its course.
One might make a similar argument in the case of every excluded producer. If
an athlete or physician is excluded by improper means, is it possible to make a
meaningful determination as to the impact on consumer welfare? Perhaps the athlete
will be a sensation, enormously appreciated by his fans. Perhaps the doctor will be
a sensation, enormously appreciated by her patients. Fans and patients should have
the opportunity to make these decisions unhindered by unjustified exclusions (or
improper competitive handicaps) imposed by organizations acting beyond the bounds
of legitimate joint enterprise.
In cases like Kor's and Silver, it is more difficult to identify a significant
consumer interest. It is implausible to suppose that the continued presence of these
plaintiffs had an impact on consumer welfare. But the Court in Klor's was concerned
that the individual exclusion might be part of a larger trend; and the instigator of the
boycott, Broadway-Hale, obviously viewed Klor's as a distinctive competitive threat.
For some consumers, the choice between Klor's and Broadway-Hale was more
significant than the choice between Broadway-Hale and the hundreds of other rivals
remaining in the market. 106
The underlying problem relates to the process of market definition. The
104. Id. at 120 n.68.
105. Concerted refusals to deal may be competitive torts. See American Law Institute, RESTAEmENT OF' m LAW OF
TORTS §§ 765-67 (1936). The category was deleted from the Second Restatement on the ground that it was within the
general field of trade regulation rather than torts. American Law Institute, REsrATENr (SEcoND) OF Toms § 762
(introductory note at 2) (1977). There is an inevitable overlap between torts and antitrust; and not all competitive torts are
antitrust violations. But the antitrust laws were intended to reach, and have been consistently construed to reach,
exclusionary actions by firms or combinations wielding economic power. On the special problems posed by concerted
action, see Copperweld Corp. v. Independence Tube Corp., 467 U.S. 752, 768-69 (1984).
106. See the similar line of reasoning in Areeda, Introduction to Antitrust Economics, 52 ANTrrRsr L.J. 523,
536-37 (1983).
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reasoning of the New Orthodoxy proceeds as follows: In the absence of a per se
offense (such as price fixing), it is necessary to show market power adversely
affecting competition in order to establish an antitrust violation.10 7 An excluded
producer must define a relevant market and persuade the court that its exclusion from
the market adversely affected competition from the consumer's perspective. Klor's
succeeded by persuading the Supreme Court that the concerted action in that case was
unlawful per se. But that solution begs the question unless per se illegality can be
premised on producer injury. Alternatively, Klor's might argue that the relevant
market was competition between Klor's and Broadway-Hale and that the market so
defined was adversely affected by the alleged combination. But the courts, particu-
larly those populated by advocates of the New Orthodoxy, would be reluctant to
accept a market defined so narrowly-even though, on the allegations of the
complaint, Broadway-Hale behaved as if such a market were a distinctive competitive
arena.
Silver is a harder case, because plaintiff's exclusion from the market was not
motivated by anticompetitive animus. To relate the exclusion of Silver to the
protection of consumer welfare is to formulate a rule so broad as to encompass every
excluded producer. The argument would have to be that every producer improperly
excluded shall be assumed to have had a role to play in protecting consumer welfare.
But this is an extremely circuitous way of reaching a conclusion that can be stated
more directly, and with much stronger support: producers as well as consumers are
protected against exclusions or other adverse impacts unjustifiably imposed by
business firms acting in concert. Carried to its extreme, the methodological
convolutions return to support the initial and primary thesis of this Article.
C. The Alignment of Objectives
The position of the New Orthodoxy is that the antitrust laws have as their
objective the advancement of consumer welfare through the promotion of economic
efficiency. Rivalry is protected to the extent required to assure economic efficiency,
but not otherwise. This description identifies the right variables, but it tells the story
backwards.
The principal purpose of the antitrust laws is the promotion of competitive
markets (which have favorable implications for consumers, producers, and other
interests, including the political process).,o 8 Rivalry is important for a number of
reasons and should be protected against incursions by restrictive practices. But
107. See, e.g., Easterbrook, The Limits of Antitrust, 63 TEx. L. REv. 1, 21 (1984). The view has been adopted by
several Courts of Appeal. See Assam Drug Co. v. Miller Brewing Co., 798 F.2d 311, 316 (8th Cir. 1986); Valley Liquors,
Inc. v. Renfield Importers, Ltd., 678 F.2d 742 (7th Cir. 1982); Muenster Butane, Inc. v. Stewart Co., 651 F.2d 292 (5th
Cir. 1981); Cowley v. Bruden Indus., 613 F.2d 751, 756 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 446 U.S. 965 (1980). The Second
Circuit has ruled to the contrary. See Eiberger v. Sony Corp., 622 F.2d 1068, 1081 (2d Cir. 1980); New York v.
Anheuser-Busch, Inc., 673 F. Supp. 664 (E.D.N.Y. 1987). Eiberger reflects the well settled doctrine that antitrust
liability "may be established by proof of either an unlawful purpose or an anticompetitive effect." McLain v. Real Estate
Board, 444 U.S. 232, 243 (1980) (emphasis in original).
108. For a more comprehensive discussion, see Blake & Jones, Towards a Three-Dimensional Antitrust Policy, 65
COLu.m. L. REv. 422, 422-40 (1965).
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restrictions may be justified by the requirements of economic efficiency and such
justifications are widely accepted.
In most cases, the two approaches yield similar results. But there are in-
stances-such as concerted refusals to deal-where the misalignment of the New
Orthodoxy leads to erroneous perceptions. In the absence of adverse impacts upon
consumers, the New Orthodoxy would tolerate exclusionary tactics that victimize
producers. There is no justification for such tolerance. Under a proper alignment of
antitrust objectives, concerted refusals to deal are subject to scrutiny in every instance
of probable exclusion or oppression and are actionable unless justified by legitimate
business reasons grounded in economic efficiency.
